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Resolving the Problem of Qualified Immunity for Private
Defendants in Section 1983 and Bivens Damage Suits*
Charles W. Thomas*

INTRODUCTION

A variety of economic and political forces are driving government
to aggressively explore the value of privatization. The process can take
many forms,' but the most common approach in the United States
involves government contracting with the private sector for the delivery
of essential public services.' As the number and variety of contracting
decisions have grown, so, too, have the complexities of the legal issues
that have confronted both contracting units of government and the
private firms on which they rely for service delivery. Although one might
assume that the legal implications of privatization would have been

*

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Southern Conference on

Corrections, Tallahassee, Florida, February 24, 1992. The author is grateful for the research
assistance provided by Mr. Steven J. Zimath, who is affiliated with the Center for Studies
in Criminology and Law and who is a student at the College of Law of the University
of Florida.
**
Professor of Criminology and Director, Center for Studies in Criminology and
Law, University of Florida; Ph.D., University of Kentucky, 1971; M.A., University of
Kentucky, 1969; B.S., McMurry University, 1966.
I. Privatization has been broadly defined as "the attainment of any public policy
goal through the participation of the private sector." National Commission for Employment
Policy, Privatization and Public Employees: The Impact of City and County Contracting
Out on Government Workers 7 (May 1988). Because an underlying purpose of privatization
is to foster competition in areas previously dominated by a governmental monopoly,
familiar forms of privatization include voucher programs that allow the holders of vouchers
to select what they perceive to be the best provider of a given service (e.g., education,
housing, and health care), asset divestitures (e.g., the sale of Conrail by the federal
government via a public stock offering in 1987), and the contracting out of a broad array
of services. See generally Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71
Marq. L. Rev. 449 (1988); Reason Foundation, Sixth Annual Report on Privatization:
Privatization, 1992 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Touche Ross, Privatization in America: An Opinion Survey of City
and County Governments on Their Use of Privatization and Their Infrastructure Needs
(1987); President's Commission on Privatization, Privatization: Toward More Effective
Government (1988).
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thoroughly explored prior to decisions to contract, experience reveals
3
that this assumption is often invalid.
To be sure, presupposing reliance on reasonably sophisticated procedures for selecting independent contractors and drafting contracts,
contracting decisions usually will give rise to few unusual or complex
legal issues. For example, the decision of a municipality to rely on
private rather than public employees for janitorial services, refuse collection, or waste water treatment is unlikely to yield extraordinary legal
concerns. However, the general appeal of privatization has prompted
government to contract with the private sector for types of services that
can and do give rise to quite a broad array of novel legal and constitutional questions. This is especially true regarding services that have
implications for the liberty interests of those who receive the services.
Notwithstanding various novel and as-yet-unresolved questions, these
more complex forms of privatization are becoming common. With increasing frequency, contracting decisions find government relying on
private firms to provide types of services that traditionally have been
provided largely or entirely by government agencies. Illustrations of this
include contracting for the management of mental health care facilities,
detention facilities which house detainees of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, correctional facilities for adjudicated delinquents,
local jails which house pre-trial detainees as well as sentenced offenders,
and state and federal prisons.
Concerned primarily with the implications for correctional privatization, this article forecasts how the federal courts ultimately will resolve
questions regarding the availability to private employees of a qualified
immunity from civil rights damage suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
or the federal analog to section 1983 created by the Supreme Court in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.4 The analysis reveals that decisions by the Supreme Court during

3. The author's personal experience provides a clear illustration of this fact. In 1985
the Florida Legislature enacted enabling legislation which authorized private management
of both local and state-level correctional facilities. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 944.105 (West Supp.
1992) (authorizing state-level contracting), and Fla. Stat. Ann. § 951.062 (West Supp.
1992) (authorizing local-level contracting). The following year, and after one Florida county
had relied on the new law when it contracted with a private corporation for the management
of its county jail, the Florida House Committee on Corrections, Probation and Parole
requested that an in-depth analysis of the legal implications be prepared. The author of
this article was the principal author of that analysis. Charles W. Thomas et al., The
Privatization of American Corrections: AnAssessment of Its Legal Implications (1988).
See also Charles W. Thomas & Linda S. Calvert Hanson, The Implications of 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 for the Privatization of Prisons, 16 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 933 (1989); and
Charles W. Thomas, Prisoners' Rights and CorrectionalPrivatization, 10 Bus. & Prof.
Ethics J. 3 (1991).
4. 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971).

19921

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

the past quarter of a century have authorized a diverse set of local,
state, and federal officials to assert a qualified immunity from liability
for monetary damages where the constitutional right violated was not
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. 5 When qualified
immunity is available, it is settled law that defendants should be permitted to terminate most actions brought against them via motions to
dismiss or motions for summary judgment.6 Indeed, any rejection by a
trial court of a claim of qualified immunity is immediately appealable. 7
Qualified immunity is said to be justified because it permits government
officials to dedicate their energy, time, and resources to serving the
public interest rather than being preoccupied by unnecessary litigation.8
However, whether private defendants in section 1983 or Bivens damage
suits will enjoy the same qualified immunity from suit remains uncertain
despite the recent holding of the Supreme Court in Wyatt v. Cole.9
Basic Background Considerations
As a general rule, private persons named as defendants in a section
1983 or a Bivens damage suit have no need to rely on the judiciallycreated qualified immunity. They can support a motion to dismiss or,
if necessary, a motion for summary judgment simply by demonstrating
that they were not government officials and are thus not subject to
liability for these constitutional torts. It is well-established that private
conduct generally does not satisfy the "color of law" and "state action"
prerequisites for a section 1983 action. 0 Thus, it is generally not possible
for plaintiffs to cast private parties as defendants in either section 1983
or Bivens actions. When, however, circumstances are such that the
harmful conduct of a private individual is fairly attributable to the state,
the "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment is met
and the private individual is said to have satisfied the "color of law"

5. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987).
6. See. e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982); Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2897 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94
S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
7. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985).
8. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2736 (1982).
9. 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992) (holding that qualified immunity is not available to private
parties in section 1983 damage suits involving reliance on state replevin, garnishment, and
attachment statutes).
10. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349, 95 S. Ct. 449, 453
(1974) (quoting from The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18 (1883)); see also
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982); and Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982).
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element of section 1983.11 This is true both as a general aspect of section
1983 litigation' 2 and as a specific aspect of section 1983 litigation in
cases involving government contracts with private persons for correctional
services. 13
Given facts sufficient to qualify a private person as a defendant in
a section 1983 or a Bivens damage action, simple logic and considerations
of fairness might suggest that the same policy considerations that provide
the foundation for many recent qualified immunity decisions of the
Court would extend in a substantially identical manner to private persons
whose conduct satisfies the fair attribution test the Supreme Court
articulated in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.' 4 Until recently, however,
the Supreme Court neither accepted nor rejected this position. Lacking
clear direction, the federal circuit courts differed widely in their judgments regarding when and even if a private person cast as a defendant
in a section 1983 suit can assert a qualified immunity. Some decisions
reflect the view that a qualified immunity from damage suits exists only

when the named defendant is a public official. 5 Other decisions reflect
a willingness to deal similarly with public officials and private persons

who assert a qualified immunity.' 6 Still other decisions seek to draw an

11. As will be discussed more fully later in the analysis, the core purpose of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is to provide a civil remedy for persons who suffer deprivations of constitutional rights as a consequence of misconduct by state officials. It was enacted "for
the expressed purpose of 'enforc[ing] the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 934, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2752 (1982) (quoting
from Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S. Ct. 1113 (1972)). In cases
involving state officials, the "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the "color of law" requirement of section 1983 have "consistently been treated as
the same thing." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 (1966).
However, the tests are separate and independent when a private party is named as a
defendant. Purely private conduct causing constitutional deprivations is beyond the scope
of section 1983. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 349, 95 S.Ct. at 453. By itself, private
conduct satisfying the "color of law" element of section 1983 is insufficient to state a
section 1983 claim. The "party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because .. .he has acted together with
or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise
chargeable to the States." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2754. Substantially the
same approach is relied upon when private parties are named in Bivens damage suits with
the exception, of course, that the focus is on "federal action" rather than "state action."
See, e.g., Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
12. See, e.g., Lugar, 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744.
13. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988).
14. 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982).
15. See, e.g., Connor v. City of Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
Ill S. Ct. 59 (1990).
16. See, e.g., Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321 (lth Cir. 1988), vacated
on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1002, 109 S. Ct. 1105 (1989).
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awkward line between qualified immunity and a good faith defense, the
former being made available to public officials and the latter being
made available to private persons. 7
Importantly, and as will be discussed in greater detail later in this
article,"8 the recent but narrow holding of the Supreme Court in Wyatt
v. Cole' 9 did not resolve core features of the disagreements that have
surfaced in decisions of the federal circuit courts. To be sure, the Wyatt
holding reveals a firm refusal to allow private party defendants named
in section 1983 damage suits to assert a qualified immunity when their
alleged misconduct involved reliance on a presumptively valid state replevin, garnishment, or attachment statute. The interests of such defendants, argued Justice O'Connor in delivering the opinion of the Court,
''are not sufficiently similar to the traditional purposes of qualified
immunity to justify such an expansion" in the categories of persons
who enjoy a qualified immunity from such damage suits.20 "Qualified
immunity," said Justice O'Connor,
strikes a balance between compensating those who have been
injured by official conduct and protecting government's ability
to perform its traditional functions . . . Accordingly, we have
recognized qualified immunity for government officials where it
was necessary to preserve their ability to serve the public good
or to ensure that talented candidates were not deterred by the
2
threat of damage suits from entering public service. '
Apparently in large measure because private party defendants in the
types of cases represented by Wyatt act in the pursuit of a narrow
commercial rather than a public interest, they will not be accorded a
qualified immunity from suit. This prompted a sharp dissent from Chief
Justice 'Rehnquist with which Justices Souter and Thomas joined," so
it is unlikely that the qualified immunity issue has been settled even in
the set of circumstances on which the Wyatt court focused its attention.
The focus of this analysis, however, is on the quite different circumstances the courts have and will continue to encounter when a governmental entity has determined that important public interests can best be
served by relying on a private rather than a public provider of an
essential service. Although such circumstances do implicate the commercial interests of private parties, they are easily distinguished from
the facts presented by Wyatt in that the private parties are working

17. See, e.g., Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988).
18. See infra notes 154-160 and accompanying text.
19. 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).
20. Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1833 (1992).
21. Id.
22. Id.at 1837 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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under contract with and serving the vital interests of a governmental
entity. These circumstances thus fall well beyond the scope of the holding
in Wyatt, so suits brought against this increasingly large category of
private actors will almost certainly continue to yield contradictory opinions
by the federal circuit courts as well as the growing number of state
23
courts before which section 1983 claims are litigated.
It is also worth noting that the legal and social policy implications
of contrary opinions regarding the availability of qualified immunity are
considerable. Correctional privatization has become the most hotly debated topic those with interests in the nation's correctional system have
witnessed during this century. Much of that debate flows from the
opposing claims that are advanced by proponents and opponents of
privatization. Proponents contend that the private sector can provide
correctional services equal to or better than those now provided by
government agencies and do so at a significantly lower cost. 24 Privatization opponents believe that the promise of quality improvements at
2
reduced costs is nothing more than empty marketing rhetoric.
A fair and objective comparison of public versus private alternatives
presupposes that public and private competitors will meet on what
amounts to a "flat playing field." Importantly, prisoner claims of
constitutional deprivations are exceedingly common and quite costly to
litigate even though they are seldom successful. 26 Thus, a major but
arguably unfair advantage in the competitive arena would go to the
public sector if the courts determine that public corrections officials can
assert a qualified immunity but that their private sector counterparts
cannot. Consequently, the primary objective of this article will be to
anticipate whether judicial interpretations of the immunities available to
defendants in constitutional tort actions will have the presumably unintended consequence of supporting the traditional monopoly public
sector correctional agencies have enjoyed.
Additionally, there is a more profound legal and philosophical issue
that is pushed into sharp relief by privatization in general and correctional privatization in particular. When a major social and political
movement like privatization-a movement whose impact is international
and not merely national in its scope-seeks to redefine the boundaries
between the public and private sector, what should be the role of law?

23. See, regarding the growth in section 1983 claims being brought in state rather
than federal courts, Steven H. Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in State Courts (1992).
24. See, e.g., Charles H. Logan, Private Prisons: Cons and Pros (1990).
25. See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration (1988).
26. See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional
Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as
Defendant, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 719 (1988); and Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models
and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 Geo. L.J. 1567 (1989).
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In the correctional context, for example, decisions to explore the potential
value of private management of facilities almost always presuppose the
enactment of enabling legislation which adequately expresses a clear
policy judgment by the legislative branch of government.27 Once a clear
policy choice has been made, to what degree should the courts recognize
the emerging new boundaries and thereby facilitate change? Alternatively,
to what degree should the courts preserve historic distinctions between
the public and private sector either until legislative action is so unequivocal or until the process of change is so complete that the content
of judicial decisions are essentially preordained? These questions will
not find final answers here, but it is certain the questions appear at
every turn in any consideration of whether qualified immunity is or is
not exclusively a means of shielding public officials from the negative
effects of insubstantial litigation.
An Overview of the Analytical Approach
This analysis will be divided into five parts. Part I reviews the
general rationale upon which the courts have relied when called on to
evaluate the appropriateness of either absolute or qualified immunity.
Part II adds to this background by reviewing the major Supreme Court
cases that have defined the tests to be used in evaluating qualified
immunity defenses raised in Bivens and in section 1983 actions.28 Part
III shifts the focus of the analysis from a general to a specific level by
examining the conflict that divides the federal circuit courts. Based on
this consideration of lower court holdings and the position taken by
the Supreme Court in Wyatt, it is argued in Part IV that there are
compelling reasons why private citizens-especially those with responsibilities that otherwise of necessity would be vested in government
officials-should enjoy precisely the same degree of immunity from a
suit as is enjoyed by their public sector counterparts. This article closes
with a brief summary and conclusions section.

27. Absent such legislation, contracting decisions are subject to nondelegation doctrine
challenges. See Robbins, supra note 25; Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation
Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 911 (1988).
28. The primary concern of the analysis is with the availability of a qualified immunity
defense to defendants in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This purpose is not
contradicted by, where appropriate, consideration of cases involving Bivens as well as
section 1983 actions. The Supreme Court has consistently observed that considerations of
access to a qualified immunity defense do not presuppose different tests or standards.
For example, in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2909 (1978), the
Court observed that "we deem it untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity
law between suits brought against state officials under Section 1983 and suits brought
directly under the Constitution against federal officials."

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

1.

[Vol. 53

THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEBATE

Examination of the present conflict regarding the availability of
qualified immunity to private defendants who are alleged to have caused
a deprivation of constitutional rights requires a careful assessment of
how and why the Supreme Court created a qualified immunity for
government officials as well as the sources of judicial disagreement when
private defendants seek to raise the same barrier to damage suits. Before
turning to those core concerns of this analysis, however, it is necessary
to put the general issue into perspective. This can be accomplished by
a very abbreviated overview of the history and purpose of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and an equally brief description of how the general rationale for
both absolute and qualified immunity has developed in recent decades. 2 9
A.

The Origins, Purpose, and Recent History of Section 1983

The origins of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be traced to Section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871.30 Its clear purpose was to provide a civil
enforcement mechanism for the Fourteenth Amendment. For nearly the
first one hundred years of its existence, however, the ability of section
1983 to play this role was undermined by narrow judicial interpretations
of its scope. Plaintiffs could rely on this federal remedy if confronted
by a state statute or other similarly formal policy statement that abridged
a constitutionally protected right,3 but the remedy vanished when dep-

29. Emphasizing section 1983 in this fashion is appropriate even though much of the
analysis deals with both section 1983 and Bivens damage suits. First, the vast majority
of suits brought by prisoner plaintiffs are brought under section 1983 rather than Bivens.
This is largely because only approximately five percent of the nation's total prisoner
population is comprised of federal prisoners. Second, the problem of qualified immunity
in Bivens actions, and also the legal reasoning relied upon by courts addressing its
availability, is substantially the same in both section 1983 and Bivens suits. See, e.g.,
Butz, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S. Ct. 2265
(1979); and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980).
30. Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The language of the present statute in its entirety
reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
31. See, e.g., Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 35 S. Ct. 932 (1915), and Nixon
v. Herndon, 273 U.S, 536, 47 S. Ct. 446 (1927).
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rivations were proximately caused by state officials whose conduct violated state law. The dominant view was that state officials who acted
in violation of state law had not acted "under color of law" and that
any remedy would thus have to be found in provisions of state law
rather than in section 1983.
Among other things, this narrow view of the scope of section 1983
gave rise to what Professor Charles Abernathy has quite properly described as the "Brer Rabbit defense." '32 Defendants whose conduct violated state law moved to dismiss section 1983 claims by arguing that
the only appropriate forum for plaintiffs was a state rather than a
federal court. Presumably, of course, the suggestion that only a state
court forum would be appropriate was motivated in part by the "home
field advantage" they felt would accrue to them in that forum.
Three decades ago the United States Supreme Court, in the landmark
case of Monroe v. Pape,3 3 fired a lethal shot at Brer Rabbit by holding
that state officials were subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §.1983 even if
their conduct violated state law. The Monroe Court also held that the
availability of a cause of action under state law was no barrier to section
1983 suits. "The federal remedy," said the Monroe Court, "is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought
34
and refused before the federal one is invoked."
Monroe thus laid the foundation for what was quickly to become
what many view as the most significant provision of modern federal
law. 3 The foundation was soon to be strengthened by at least four
developments. First, in Maine v. Thiboutot'6 the Court held that section
1983 was not limited to circumstances involving deprivations of constitutional rights and that plaintiffs could rely on it as a remedy for
violations of rights secured by federal statutes. 37 Second, in Thiboutot

32.

Charles F. Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 Geo. L.J. 1441,

1445 (1989).
33. 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961).
34. Id. at 183, 81 S. Ct. at 482.

35. See, e.g., Martin A. Schwartz & John E. Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims,
Defenses, and Fees (1986). The authors' claim, expressed in the very first sentence of
this influential treatise, is quite matter-of-fact: "No statute is more important in contemporary American law than Section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871."
36. 448 U.S. I, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
37. The scope of the holding of Maine v. Thiboutot continues to be debated. Generally
speaking, however, plaintiffs can rely on section 1983 remedies when a federal statute
has conferred a right to them and the statute does not itself contain an exclusive remedy
for the violation of the right conferred. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981); Wright v. City of
Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 107 S. Ct. 266 (1987); Golden
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 1lO S. Ct. 444 (1989); and
Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Assoc., 496 U.S. 498, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990).
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38
and in Martinez v. California
the Court held that section 1983 plaintiffs
could bring their claims in either state or federal court. Third, the
enactment of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,
which amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988, authorized trial courts to "allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs" in section 1983 actions. The definition of
"prevailing party" is expansive. For instance, in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 9
the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs meet the definition "if they
succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the
benefit the parties sought in bringing suit."' 0 Not surprisingly, the availability of fees to prevailing parties has encouraged attorneys to litigate
section 1983 claims far more vigorously than they would have otherwise.
Finally, although relevant only in cases involving local units of government as potential defendants, the Court's 1978 decision in Monell v.
Department of Social Services4' overruled the portion of Monroe that
held municipalities immune from section 1983 liability. By holding that
a municipality was a "person" for section 1983 purposes, Monell massively expanded the number of potential section 1983 claims.
In short, the past three decades have witnessed the transformation
of section 1983 from its relatively trivial pre-Monroe status into the
dominant means by which a broad array of constitutional and federal
statutory rights are shielded from assault by public officials or private
persons whose conduct satisfies the "state action" and "color of law"
tests. Its broad scope includes the "deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." Thus, an exceedingly diverse array of conduct involving representatives of state or
local government can give rise to a section 1983 suit. Its remedies include
"an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
Further, similar but less expansive developments involving constitutional
deprivations caused by the exercise of federal rather than state power
have taken place since the Court's 1971 decision in Bivens.42 These
developments in the area of constitutional torts swiftly reached a point
resulting in many thousands of suits each year.

B.

The Growing Tension Between Judicial Definitions of the Public
Interest, the Rights of Section 1983, and Bivens Plaintiffs

The manner in which Monroe and to a lesser extent Bivens required
the federal courts to address an issue that necessarily arises in a diverse
38. 444 U.S. 277, 100 S. Ct. 553 (1980).
39. 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
40. Id. at 433, 103 S. Ct. at 1939.
41. 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
42. In addition to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971); see, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.
Ct. 2264 (1979), and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980).
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set of circumstances within which plaintiffs alleged that government
conduct caused them to suffer deprivations of rights secured by the
Constitution is of central importance to this analysis. It was quickly
recognized that subjecting government officials to personal liability for
damages creates a dilemma which the courts must approach with considerable caution. On the one hand, of course, there is a clear need to
protect the rights of citizens. It is generally recognized that the availability
of damage awards can serve that objective both in the obvious sense
of fairly compensating victims and in the somewhat less obvious sense
of known personal liability exposure serving as a deterrent to further
misconduct. Indeed, it often is the case that "[ijnjunctive or declaratory
relief is useless to a person who has already been injured." 4 In such
cases, as the Supreme Court observed in Bivens, "it is damages or
nothing.""4 On the other hand, however, there is a need "to protect
the officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related
public45 interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.',
A persistent tension thus flows from a strong desire on the part of
the courts simultaneously to balance the rights of individual plaintiffs,
the rights of defendants, and the public interest. It necessarily follows
that such a balancing of interests often requires compromise. A major
means by which the courts have sought to create a reasonable balance
between these often contrary interests has been provided by judicial
decisions classifying circumstances under which government officials enjoy either an absolute or a qualified immunity from damage suits. If
defendants are in a position which permits them to assert a qualified
immunity defense successfully, then the action brought against them46
ordinarily will not survive beyond their motions for summary judgment.
The primary concern here is with interpretations of when qualified
immunity is appropriate. Still, it is worth noting that the availability of
either absolute or qualified immunity from damage suits flows in large
measure from the function of the officials whose acts are said to have47
been the causes of injuries rather than from the positions they hold.
For example, the Supreme Court has held that "judicial, prosecutorial,

43. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2910 (1978).
44. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410, 91 S. Ct. at 2012.
45. Butz, 438 U.S. at 506, 98 S. Ct. at 2911.
46. This will not always be the case, for there are some section 1983 causes of action
wherein the intent of the defendant is cast as an element of the alleged constitutional
tort. See, e.g., Gary S. Gildin, Immunizing Intentional Violations of Constitutional Rights
Through Judicial Legislation: The Extension of Harlow v. Fitzgerald to Section 1983
Actions, 38 Emory L.J. 369 (1989).
47. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 100
S. Ct. 1967 (1980) and Burns v. Reed, Ill S. Ct. 1934 (1991).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

and legislative functions require absolute immunity. '4 Thus, there are
circumstances which give rise to an award of absolute immunity from
suits to persons other than judges, prosecutors, and legislators when
their functions are deemed to be sufficiently quasi-judicial, quasi-prosecutorial, or quasi-legislative. 49 Conversely, the immunity accorded judges,
prosecutors, and legislators can become qualified rather than absolute
when the functions they perform are not deemed to require so complete
a degree of insulation from civil damage suits.50 Generally speaking,
however, most administrative and executive officials are accorded a
qualified rather than an absolute immunity from civil damage suits.
Put just a bit differently, decisions to accord an absolute or a
qualified immunity from civil damage suits do not flow from a special
sympathy the courts have for section 1983 or Bivens defendants merely
because they are government officials. They flow instead from a consistent desire, when and where appropriate, to prevent such suits from
placing those charged with the execution of government policies in the
untenable position of being required to exercise discretion while at the
same time exposing them to personal liability for discretionary acts they
reasonably believed to be lawful and from undermining the willingness
of officials to serve the public interest through a vigorous and decisive
exercise of their powers." Thus, two themes are prominent in the developing body of what amounts to a federal common law regarding
immunity from damage suits. One theme places a priority on the unfairness of holding officials accountable for deprivations of rights which
were not clearly established at the time of the deprivations. The other
theme justifies immunity from suit primarily on policy grounds.
Although recent decisions arguably place greater emphasis on the
latter public interest rationale than on the former fairness rationale,
repeatedly one or both of these points has been given emphasis in
relevant decisions of the Supreme Court. Thus, for example, in Pierson
v. Ray 2 the Court observed that "[a] policeman's lot is not so unhappy
that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if
he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in

48. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2734 (1982).
49. See, e.g., Butz, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (administrative law judges and
federal hearing examiners are entitled to absolute immunity given their quasi-judicial
functions) and Lake County Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,
99 S. Ct. 1171 (1979) (some officials of county government are entitled to absolute
immunity given their quasi-legislative functions).
50. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988) (non-judicial,
administrative acts by judges are not to be accorded absolute immunity).
51. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813, 102 S. Ct. at 2735; and Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (1987).
52. 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213 (1967).
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damages if he does. . . .[Tihe same consideration would seem to require
excusing him from liability for acting under a statute that he reasonably
believed to be valid but that was later held to be unconstitutional, on
its face or as applied."" A few years later the Court
noted "two mutually
4
dependent rationales" in Scheuer v. Rhodes:
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of
subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal
obligations of his position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger
that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to
execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required
by the public good."
6
Similarly, the 1982 case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald%
placed heavy emphasis
on the general costs of damage suits by noting that such suits impose
a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a
whole. These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the
deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office....
[Also] there is the danger that fear of being sued will "dampen
the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible
[public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.""
Finally, in Anderson v. Creighton" the Court noted that "permitting
damage suits against government officials can entail substantial social
costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and
harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their
duties. "9
These and other related features of the major qualified immunity
cases that have been decided by the Supreme Court require more careful
and individualized treatment before considering the conflicting views on
the availability of immunity to private party defendants. Indeed, because
both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have varied the importance
they assign to common law immunities which were available when section
1983 was enacted in 1871, the historical dimension of the issue demands
special attention.

53. Id. at 555, 87 S. Ct. at 1218. It should be noted that the Court used this case
to extend its holding in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S. Ct. 783 (1951),
regarding the availability of absolute immunity to legislators, acting within their legislative
roles, to judges.
54. 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1973).
55. Id. at 240, 94 S. Ct. at 1688.
56. 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
57. Id. at 814, 102 S. Ct. at 2736, quoting from Gregorie v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,
581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, 70 S. Ct. 803 (1950).
58. 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987).
59. Id. at 638, 107 S. Ct. at 3038.
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THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Efforts by commentators and courts to define the nature and scope
of immunity as it pertains to constitutional torts have confronted a host
of problems from the very beginning. Not the least consequential of
these problems flows from the fact that the plain language of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 does not provide for either absolute or qualified immunity. To
the contrary, it simply states that "[e]very person who," under color
of state law, "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any ...person ...
to the deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable ... in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress." 6 Thus, the plain language of the statute
suggests that no person, without regard to the nature of his or her
office or to the function he or she serves, will be permitted to assert
either an absolute or a qualified immunity from damage suits brought
6
under section 1983 or, presumably, Bivens. '
It is true, of course, that the Supreme Court resolved this problem
to its own satisfaction in early immunity cases. In Pierson,62 the first
case in which the Court held that a qualified immunity was available
to some section 1983 defendants, a majority of the Court brushed aside
the apparent problem. The Court said,
[wie do not believe that this settled principle of law [the availability of absolute immunity to judges as a matter of common
law] was abolished by § 1983, which makes liable "every person"
who under color of law deprives another person of his civil
rights. The legislative record gives no clear indication that Con63
gress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.
Even in 1967, however, it was far from clear whether the Court
was validly interpreting the intent of the Forty-Second Congress or was
responding to its own social policy considerations by recognizing immunities for section 1983 defendants which the Forty-Second Congress
had not envisioned in 1871. Indeed, a sound case can be made to
support the hypothesis that the Forty-Second Congress fully understood

60.
61.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971). Here again it should be emphasized that

judicial decisions regarding the availability of either absolute or qualified immunity consistently have failed to draw a consequential distinction between Bivens actions brought
against federal officials and section 1983 actions brought against state officials or private
parties. Even in recent opinions of the Supreme Court reviews of precedent blend these
two types of constitutional torts together with little or no effort to distinguish one from
the other. See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034.
62. 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213 (1967).
63. Id. at 554, 87 S. Ct. at 1218; see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71
S. Ct. 783 (1951).
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that the legislation it was considering would deprive officials of commonlaw immunity defenses but decided not to recognize those defenses given
the broad remedial purposes of the statute it later enacted."
One need go no further than the text of Pierson itself to begin to
support this position. Specifically, in Pierson61 Justice Douglas wrote a
sharp dissent to the majority opinion just as he previously had dissented
from an earlier holding in Tenney v. Brandhove," a 1951 case in which
the Court accorded absolute immunity from suit to legislators so long
as they "were acting in a field where legislators traditionally have power
to act." ' 67 With multiple references to the debate which took place before
this civil rights legislation was enacted, Justice Douglas argued that
[the position that Congress did not intend to change the common-law rule of judicial immunity ignores the fact that every
member of Congress who spoke to the issue assumed the words
of the statute meant exactly what they said and that judges
would be liable .... In light of the sharply contested nature of
the issue of judicial immunity it would be reasonable to assume
that the judiciary would have been expressly exempted from the
wide sweep of the section, if Congress had intended such a
result .68
Thus, quite apart from what tests are appropriate for determining
when defendants in constitutional tort actions enjoy the right to assert
a qualified immunity from suit, the history of judicial efforts to accord
at least some officials some type of immunity are beset with much
ambiguity. The problem cannot be validly brushed aside as the Court
did in Pierson via the simple assertion that "[tihe legislative record gives
no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all commonlaw immunities" 69 when it enacted what is now codified by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Indeed, sharp criticism of such a simplistic approach is abundant.
Recently, for example, Rudovsky argued that:
Its development in the Supreme Court has been marked by ad
hoc decision-making, conflicting rationales, and a high degree
of doctrinal manipulation. Today, it stands as a legal principle
defined primarily by the Court's own policy judgment that an
individual's right to compensation for constitutional violations
and the deterrence of unconstitutional conduct should be sub-

64. See, e.g., Richard A. Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The
Limits of the Court's Historical Analysis, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 741 (1987).
65.

Pierson, 386 U.S. at 558, 87 S. Ct. at 1220 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).

66. 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783 (1951).
67. Id. at 379, 71 S.Ct. at 789.
68. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 561, 563, 87 S. Ct. at 1221, 1222.
69. Id.at 554, 87 S. Ct. at 1218.
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ordinated to the governmental interest in effective and vigorous
execution of governmental policies and programs. 0
Rudovsky's criticism of the present status of the qualified immunity
defense is perhaps a bit too caustic, but he is undeniably correct in
pointing to a balancing of interests test that the Court has struggled to
create. A fair reading of the cases that have been decided by the Court
supports the view that a flexible blend of historical interpretation and
social policy considerations has provided the foundation for this set of
opinions.
The Court's emphasis on the history of section 1983 need not occupy
us any longer. More important to the purpose here is identifying the
evolving standards the Court has established for evaluating the viability
of qualified immunity defenses. The first case in which this issue was
decided was Pierson,71 which involved the liability of several police
officers and a municipal police justice. The officers had arrested several
civil rights demonstrators and charged each with a misdemeanor. Although the case was remanded for retrial,72 the Court suggested that a
police officer should be excused from liability "for acting under a statute
he reasonably believed to be valid," 73 even if the statute later was found
to be unconstitutional, and held that "the defense of good faith and
probable cause ... is ... available to them [police officers] in the
action under Section 1983." 74 However, beyond this modest language,
a reference to the linkage between the recognition of a qualified immunity
in section 1983 actions and some liability limitations previously recognized in tort law, 75 and the fact that the case made immunity considerations an important aspect of constitutional tort jurisprudence, one
finds little in Pierson on which to base the prediction of future developments.
A few years later the Court again confronted problems regarding
the availability of qualified immunity in the case of Scheuer v. Rhodes.7 6
Scheuer involved section 1983 damage claims brought against the Governor of Ohio and various other state officials on behalf of students
who were killed during the anti-war demonstrations at Kent State University. The Court rejected any general rule that the government officials
enjoy an absolute immunity from damage suits, 7 7 and noted that

70. David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 23, 36 (1989).
71. Pierson, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213.
72. Id.at 558, 87 S. Ct. at 1219.
73. Id.at 555, 87 S. Ct. at 1218.
74. Id.at 557, 87 S. Ct. at 1219.

75. Id.
76. 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1973).
77. Id. at 232, 94 S.Ct. at 1683.
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in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers
of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of the discretion and responsibilities of
the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared
at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be
based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief
formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled
with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity
of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official
conduct."8
The implication of Scheuer was that future qualified immunity cases
would confront both an objective test via its "reasonable grounds for
the belief" language and a subjective test via its "good-faith belief"
language. 79 It was uncertain which party would bear the burden of
proof.
However clear the implications of Scheuer may now appear to have
been regarding the evaluation of qualified immunity defenses, less than
a year was to pass before the Court chose to clarify its position in
Wood v. Strickland.s0 This somewhat unusual case involved a section
1983 action brought against members of an Arkansas school board by
two sixteen-year-old girls following a school board decision to expel
them from a public school after a determination that they had served
"spiked" punch at a school function."s Noting lower court confusion
regarding interpretations of qualified immunity raised by school officials,8 2 and also noting the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial functions school board members often have, 3 the Court held that school
board members are entitled to a qualified immunity.
More importantly, the Court sought to explain its position on the
objective and subjective components of the test implied in Scheuer. "As
we see it," said the Court,
the appropriate standard contains elements of both. The official
himself must be acting sincerely and with a belief that he is
doing right [the subjective test), but an act violating a student's
constitutional rights can be no more justified by ignorance or

78. Id. at 247-48, 94 S. Ct. at 1692 (emphasis added).
79. This case expanded the class of government officials to whom a qualified immunity
defense was available in section 1983 from the police, the group identified by Pierson,
to include state governors, chief executive officers of state universities, and senior and
subordinate officers of state national guard groups.
'80. 420 U.S. 308, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975).
81. Id. at 311-13, 95 S. Ct. at 995-96.
82. Id. at 308, 95 S. Ct. at 994.
83. Id. at 319, 95 S. Ct. at 999.
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disregard of settled, indisputable law [the objective test] on the
part of one entrusted with supervision of students' daily lives
than be the presence of actual malice ....

Therefore ...

we

hold that a school board member is not immune from liability
for damages under Section 1983 if he knew or reasonably should
have known that the action he took ... would violate the
constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the
action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to the student.A4

Thus, school board members, and by implication any others who claimed
qualified immunity, would not be shielded from damage claims in section
1983 actions if they acted either with "the malicious intention to cause
a deprivation" 85 or with a "disregard of ... clearly established constitutional rights. ' s6 Put differently, the Wood Court depicted the qualified immunity defense as one which posed both questions of law to

be resolved on a motion for summary judgment and a factual issue to
be resolved quite probably if not necessarily at trial-presupposing, of
course, allegations of malice. This two-pronged approach to evaluating

qualified immunity remained in place throughout the balance of the
1970s and the early part of the 1980s as the Supreme Court extended
the availability of qualified immunity to other categories of government

officials."
The objective prong of the Wood test caused the lower courts
relatively few problems. They understood the test to be one which posed
a purely legal issue capable of resolution on a motion for summary
judgment by defendants. The same cannot be said of the subjective
prong of the test. Its application often involved factual contradictions

84. Id. at 321-22, 95 S. Ct. at 1000-01.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975) (qualified
immunity defense made available to state mental hospital administrators), and Procunier
v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S. Ct. 855 (1978) (qualified immunity defense made
available to corrections officials). Some commentators have argued that post-Wood cases
expanded the scope of the qualified immunity defense. See, e.g., Kathryn R. Urbonya,
Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: Qual ied Immunity in Section 1983 Actions
for a Police Officer's Use of Excessive Force, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 61 (1989). The point
need not be debated here, but there is language in Navarette that can be seen as either
clarifying or expanding the objective prong of the Wood test:
the immunity defense would be unavailing to petitioners if the constitutional
right allegedly infringed by them was clearly established at the time of their
challenged conduct, if they knew or should have known of that right, and if
they knew or should have known that their conduct violated the constitutional
norm.
Procunier, 434 U.S. at 562, 98 S. Ct. at 860.
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between plaintiffs' assertions of malicious intent on the part of defendants and defendants' claims that they had no such intent. This is
precisely the type of question that courts traditionally have depended
on trial juries to answer.
Not surprisingly, the subjective prong of the Wood test invited
creative pleadings on the part of attorneys representing section 1983
plaintiffs "because even conclusory allegations of malicious intent would
force an official into court to defend against an otherwise frivolous
lawsuit." 88 Reliance on this tactic, of course, undermined the goal of
the Wood Court to use the qualified immunity test as a means of
shielding officials from the loss of time and resources they would encounter if they were continuously obliged to mount full-scale legal defenses when they encountered frivolous lawsuits.
Clearly, then, the Court's approach to qualified immunity in Wood,
while perhaps adding some necessary clarification to its earlier cases,
fell short of achieving its policy objectives at the same point at which
the growing appeal of section 1983 was spawning a flood of constitutional
tort litigation. The opportunity to alleviate the mounting tension came
9
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald."
There the Court began by noting that
[t]he resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative....
It cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against
the innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the
defendant officials, but to society as a whole. These social costs
include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy
from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens
from acceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger
that fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the
most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties ....
In identifying qualified
immunity as the best attainable accommodation of competing
values ... we relied on the assumption that this standard would
permit "[ilnsubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." 90
The Harlow Court went on to recognize explicitly that the subjective
prong of the two-pronged Wood test had undermined the goal articulated
in Butz v. Economou9' of precluding insubstantial claims from proceeding

88. Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Note, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The
Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 Yale L.J. 126, 132
(1985).
89. 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
90. Id. at 813-14, 102 S. Ct. at 2736 (quoting from Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 507-08, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2911-12 (1978)).
91. 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1968).
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to trial. The Court concluded that "it now is clear that substantial costs
attend the litigation of the subjective good faith of government officials." 92 In particular, the Court argued, "[jiudicial inquiry into subjective motivation... may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing
of numerous persons, including an official's professional colleagues.
Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government. ''91

Based on these considerations-considerations clearly driven more
by a perceived need to resolve a social policy dilemma than by any
deference to common-law immunities which may have existed in 1871the Court then abandoned the subjective prong of the Wood test and
held that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.'"'9 The expressed view
of the Court was that relying exclusively on a purely objective test
as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid
excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of
many insubstantial claims on summary judgment .... If the law

...was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably
be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor
could he fairly be said to "know" that the law forbade conduct
not previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. 9'
Additionally, the Harlow Court held out the possibility that officials
might be able to plead a qualified immunity even in cases involving
infringements of clearly defined rights "if the official pleading the

defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither
96
knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard."

92. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816, 102 S. Ct. at 2737.
93. Id. at 817, 102 S. Ct. at 2737-38.
94. Id. at 818, 102 S. Ct. at 2737. Even though Harlow involved a Bivens rather
than a section 1983 action, the Court, quoting from its earlier language in Butz, made
it clear that the holding in Harlow was intended to apply to section 1983 cases.
This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity available
to state officials sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
We have found previously, however, that it would be "untenable to draw a
distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state
officials under Section 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution
against federal officials."
Id. at 818 n.30, 102 S. Ct. at 2738 n.30.
95. Id.
96. Id. See also Barnett v. Housing Auth., 707 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir. 1983); McElveen
v. County of Prince William, 725 F.2d 954 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819, 105
S. Ct. 88 (1984); Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S, 1010, 106 S. Ct. 1183 (1986); Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1988).
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Notwithstanding the clear intent of the Harlow Court to fashion a

purely objective means by which the lower courts could dispose of
meritless Bivens and section 1983 cases at the earliest possible phase of

litigation, a host of substantive and procedural problems left unresolved
by Harlow spawned subsequent clarifying cases 97 as well as a good deal

of scholarly commentary.98 Many if not most of the problems the Court
has agreed to consider have involved such questions as when "statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known"
became "clearly established, '" 99 the amount of time that should pass
between when a statute is enacted or a right is declared and the time
at which officials of varying ranks and with varying access to counsel
reasonably can be expected to have knowledge of the implicated right,
and the degree to which clearly established law must match the facts
of new cases.
Such problems as these surprised no one. In Harlow, for instance,
the Court expressly declined to define "the circumstances under which
'the state of the law' should be 'evaluated by reference to the opinions
of this Court, the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District Court." ' ' °
Similarly, because even the objective test established by Harlow requires
,that attention be given to the facts of individual cases as well as to the
status of existing law at the time of alleged infringements of rights, it
is improbable that the Harlow Court or any other court could formulate
more specific standards than those established in Harlow and refined
in at least some regards by such recent cases as Anderson.10
There remain, in short, problems with the objective test created in
Harlow and its progeny for evaluating qualified immunity claims. There
97. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982); Davis v.
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S. Ct. 3012 (1984); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105
S. Ct. 2806 (1985); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986); and Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987).
98. See, e.g., Balcerzak, supra note 88; Alfredo Garcia, The Scope of Policy Immunity
From Civil Suit Under Title 42 Section 1983 and Bivens: A Realistic Appraisal, 11 Whittier
L. Rev. 511 (1989); Catherine D. Glover and Elizabeth W. Fox, Qualified Immunity for
Private Party Defendants in Section 1983 Civil Rights Cases, 5 St. John's J. Legal
Comment. 267 (1980); Kit Kinports, Habeas Corpus, Qualifed Immunity, and Crystal
Balls: Predicting the Course of Constitutional Law, 33 Ariz. L. Rev. 115 (1991); Kit
Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 Ga.
L. Rev. 597 (1989); John D. Kirby, Qualified Immunity for Civil Rights Violations:
Refining the Standard, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 462 (1990); Matasar, supra note 64; Laura
Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 935 (1989); Urbonya, supra note 87; Gildin, supra note 46; and Note,
Anderson v. Creighton: Qual ied Immunity-Is Good Faith All That Is Required?, 10
Bridgeport L. Rev. 255 (1989).
99. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982).
100. Id. at 819 n.32, 102 S. Ct. at 2738 n.32 (quoting from Procunier v. Navarette,
434 U.S. 555, 565, 98 S.Ct. 855, 861 (1978)).
101. Anderson, 483 U. S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034.
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is no reason to suspect that these problems will be resolved soon.
Importantly, however, the Court has repeatedly observed that permitting
discretionary government activities to give rise to meritless civil damage
suits so adversely affects the ability of government to meet its obligations
to the public that defendants in such suits must have a right to terminate
such suits by motions for summary judgment. Indeed, the Court has
made it abundantly clear that "[t]he entitlement is an immunity from
suit rather than a mere defense to liability."'' 2
The Court has described its recognition of the appropriateness of
according a broad spectrum of public officials access to qualified immunity from section 1983 and Bivens damage suits as having flowed
from understandings of immunity defenses that were well-established
when the Forty-Second Congress enacted what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As has long been its habit, the Court thereby has sought to deny that
it has created any new body of immunity law. However, this timehonored judicial tactic is almost universally viewed as being an altogether
transparent means by which the Court has justified its creation of a
new body of immunity law during recent decades. Discussing both
absolute and qualified immunities, Professor Schuck describes this reality
accurately and concisely:
Damage remedies under Section 1983 are subject to whatever
official or governmental immunities the defendant is entitled to
invoke. The immunities are wholly creatures of federal common
law; their availability in a given case depends upon a two-part
inquiry that analyzes both historical and policy considerations.
First, if an immunity was established at common law in 1871
(when Section 1983 was enacted), did the enacting Congress
intend to preserve or abrogate it? Second, if an immunity was
not so established, would the purposes of Section 1983 be advanced by recognizing it? 103
The problem to which attention now turns, therefore, involves how
the lower courts have interpreted the scope of existing qualified immunity
law when various categories of private rather than government actors
have sought to rely on it in their efforts to shield themselves from
section 1983 and Bivens damage suits. The true question being raised
is substantially the same as Professor Schuck's second question. Would
the purposes of section 1983 and Bivens be properly served by permitting
private persons to claim a qualified immunity from suit and, if so, what
standards ought to define the circumstances under which such an immunity is appropriate?
102. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2815 (1985) (orders
denying qualified immunity subject to immediate appeal) (emphasis in original).
103. Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs 20304 (1983). See also Matasar, supra note 64, at 64.
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THE AVAILABILITY.OF

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY TO PRIVATE

DEFENDANTS IN SECTION

1983

AND

BIVENS

ACTIONS

A critical evaluation of judicial views regarding the availability of
qualified immunity to private parties in section 1983 or Bivens actions
is not easy. Much of the difficulty flows from the limited Supreme
Court guidance and the modest number of section 1983 and Bivens
cases that have reached the lower federal courts. Further, forecasting
how the immunity issue will be resolved where private parties have acted
on behalf of government as a consequence of government decisions to
privatize methods of service delivery is hampered by the fact that few
reported cases were factually based on this type of relationship between
the public and private sectors.
Over and above these relatively matter-of-fact obstacles to achieving
the purpose of this analysis is a more general problem. The fundamental
purpose of section 1983 is to provide a civil remedy for plaintiffs who
suffer constitutional deprivations because of the conduct of state officials. Bivens actions have substantially the same purpose, but they address
deprivations caused by federal officials. Thus, purely private conduct,
including conduct that undeniably causes deprivations of well-established
constitutional rights, cannot provide a suitable basis for either a section
1983 or a Bivens suit. Only when the relationship between government
and private persons is such that the private persons are transformed
into state actors in the section 1983 context or federal actors in the
Bivens context can plaintiffs establish a cause of action against a private
person.
The effect of this barrier to potential section 1983 and Bivens
plaintiffs is clear. The plaintiff must establish that the relationship
between a private person and state or federal officials allows the private
person to be cast as a defendant in a constitutional tort action. If
plaintiffs are unable to shoulder that burden, any consideration of the
immunity from suit the private party might assert becomes superfluous.
If, on the other hand, that burden is shouldered successfully, the burden
shifts to the private party defendant.
In practical terms, then, any consideration of qualified immunity
for private defendants in section 1983 or Bivens damage suits necessarily
involves a two-pronged analysis. Even though the focus of this commentary is on the qualified immunity dimension of this analysis, at least
a general consideration of the "state action" and "federal action"
dimension is necessary.
A.

Transforming Private Parties Into State or Federal Actors

Because the vast majority of reported cases have arisen in the section
1983 context, it is appropriate to focus on how a private party can be
transformed into what amounts to a state actor. Importantly, however,
substantially the same logic is relied upon when the federal courts
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confront Bivens suits in which private persons are named as defendants. °0
The core analytical problem requires drawing a bright line between
the "state action" requirement that must be satisfied before the "shield"
of the Fourteenth Amendment can be raised and the "color of law"
element one finds in section 1983. In the typical section 1983 cases
involving government officials, this important distinction is rather rou0 1 for example,
tinely brushed aside. In United States v. Price,1
the Court
observed that "[in cases under Section 1983, 'under color' of law has
consistently been treated as the same thing as the 'state action' required
under the Fourteenth Amendment.' "' ' Indeed, even when confronted
with cases in which government officials had engaged in conduct which
violated state law, the Court has held that the conduct still constituted
state action and still satisfied the color of law requirement.'0 7
Judicial approaches change significantly when a private party rather
than a government official is cast as a defendant. "Under color of law"
ceases to be equivalent to "state action." Instead, assessments of whether
a private party qualifies as a section 1983 defendant must distinguish
and then consider separately the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and the color of law requirement of section 1983.
The most distinctive feature of this review is that private conduct which
is found to meet the "color of law" requirement does not by itself
transform private acts into conduct which is fairly attributable to the
state. Although the plain language of the statute speaks in terms of
persons who act "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage" of any state, interpretations of section 1983 in cases
involving private defendants consistently have demanded evidence of
some type or degree of linkage between private conduct and the state
itself. 101

104.
Trotter,
105.
106.
107.

See, e.g., Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1984); and F.E.
Inc. v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1989).
383 U.S. 787, 86 S. Ct. 1152 (1966).
Id. at 794 n.7, 86 S. Ct. at 1157 n.7.
See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473 (1961).

108. The Court has not developed a precise test for the circumstances that transform
a private actor who cannot be cast as a defendant in a section 1983 or Bivens suit into
a quasi-state actor against whom such suits may be brought. In Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722, 81 S. Ct. 856, 860 (1961), for example, the Court
observed that "[oInly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." The Court
on numerous occasions has sought to clarify its position on the issue, the most notable
of these being Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982);
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982); and Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 2777 (1982). More recent cases suggest that the issue continues
to pose considerable difficulties for the lower courts. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 108 S.Ct. 2250 (1988) and National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S.
179, 109 S.Ct. 454 (1988).
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This demand, in turn, has resulted in variously named tests being
relied upon before conduct satisfying the section 1983 color of law
requirement also would be viewed as satisfying the Fourteenth Amendment state action requirement. It is not necessary for each of the various
tests to be examined in any detail here.' °9 It is sufficient to note that
private conduct, although not ordinarily subject to claims brought under
section 1983 even when the conduct complained of was authorized by
state law, becomes subject to a section 1983 suit only when "the conduct
allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right" is "fairly attributable
to the State." 10 This is possible when the private party "has acted
together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or
because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.""' Even though
the fair attribution test of Lugar is not impossible for section 1983 or
Bivens plaintiffs to meet, the difficulties it presents are such that private
parties only infrequently appear as defendants.
B.

Cases Addressing the Availability of Qualified Immunity to
Private Defendants

As noted earlier, decisions regarding the availability of qualified
immunity to private defendants in either section 1983 or Bivens damage
suits are not numerous. Apart from the problems plaintiffs encounter
in meeting the fair attribution test of Lugar, the paucity of cases is a
consequence of the relatively recent origins of qualified immunity in the
section 1983 context and the even more recent origins of Bivens suits.
The first recognition of a qualified immunity even for public officials
in section 1983 cases came in 1967 with the holding of the Court in
Pierson v. Ray;"' Bivens actions did not exist before 1971. Further, as
was established in Part II of this analysis, the law of qualified immunity
did not develop rapidly. Indeed, significant expansions of the scope of
and meaningful efforts to define the standards for qualified immunity
defenses did not come until the period following the 1974 holding of
3
the Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes."
A majority of the federal circuit courts have taken a position on
the issue notwithstanding influences that have combined to limit the
number of reported cases within which private access to qualified immunity is addressed. As will quickly become apparent, the differences
in their positions are sharp.

109. See generally I Sheldon H. Nahmod, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation
§ 2 (3d ed. 1991); Thomas & Calvert Hanson, supra note 3; Schwartz & Kirklin, supra
note 35, at 98-112.
110. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2753 (1982).
Ill. Id., 102 S. Ct. at 2754.
112. 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213 (1967).
113. 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
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1. Lower Court Decisions According Qualified Immunity to

Private Defendants
Folsom Investment Co. v. Moore, ' 4 a Fifth Circuit case, involved
a private party who had invoked a state attachment statute. Folsom is
a better illustration than would be provided by isolated earlier cases
involving private defendants because it was not decided until after the
Supreme Court issued opinions in both Lugar and Harlow. Indeed, the
Fifth Circuit delayed deciding this case until the state action issue before
the Court in Lugar had been resolved."s

Based at least in significant part on a portion of the Court's opinion
in Lugar,"6 the Fifth Circuit held "that a Section 1983 defendant who

has invoked an attachment statute is entitled to an immunity from
monetary liability so long as he neither knew nor reasonably should
have known that the statute was unconstitutional."" 7 This holding, the

court went on to observe, did not flow from any judgment that the
qualified immunity was derived from any immunity the county sheriff
may have had when he enforced the attachment statute. Specifically,
said the court:
the private party who invokes a presumptively valid attachment
law is not entitled to an immunity because the officer executing
it is. Rather, quite independently, the private party is entitled

to an immunity because of the important public interest in
permitting ordinary citizens to rely on presumptively valid state

114. 681 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal
Aid, 848 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1988) (trial court's denial of qualified immunity to private
defendants who had not acted with objective good faith was appropriate).
115. Folsoim, 681 F.2d at 1037.
116. Writing for the majority in Lugar, Justice White observed that
[iun
our view . . . this problem [subjecting private persons to liability for section
1983 damage claims] should be dealt with not by changing the character of the
cause of action but by establishing an affirmative defense. A similar concern
is at least partially responsible for the availability of a good-faith defense, or
qualified immunity, to state officials.

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 942 n.23, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2756 n.23 (1982).
Justice Powell, whose dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor,
agreed with this suggestion: "The Court suggests that respondent may be entitled to claim
good-faith immunity from this suit for civil damages .... This is a positive suggestion
with which I agree." Id. at 956 n.14, 102 S. Ct. at 2763 n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
117. Folsom, 681 F.2d 1032, 1037. The holding also sought to apply the Harlowbased objective test. Of potential significance in that regard is the Fifth Circuit's view
that application of this objective test in cases involving private defendants might reasonably
be less stringent than would be the test as applied to public officials. Specifically, the
Court suggested that "we are unwilling to conclude for all times that a private citizen
should be charged with the same degree of knowledge as to whether a statute or practice
is unconstitutional that would be attributed to a public official." Id.
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laws, in shielding citizens from monetary damages when they
reasonably resort to a legal process later held to be unconstitutional, and in protecting a private citizen from liability when
his role in any unconstitutional action is marginal .... There
are compelling public policy justifications for an immunity protecting a private citizen.... These reasons alone justify an
immunity. 1,a
Over and above compelling policy reasons, the Folsom court also
noted the pre-section 1983 availability of a common law defense in
attachment cases." 9 This appears to reflect the court's effort to distinguish this case from the position the Supreme Court had taken a year
earlier in Owen v. City of Independence,1 0 a case in which the Court
denied immunity defenses to local units of government in part on the
basis of the lack of related common law defenses at the time section
1983 was enacted. Thus, the Folsom court, although basing its holding
primarily on policy considerations, was able to contend that "[wie have
merely transformed a common law defense extant at the time of Section
1983's passage into an immunity."''
Other courts confronted with debtor-creditor cases both within and
beyond the boundaries of the Fifth Circuit have been persuaded that
private defendants in section 1983 damage suits should be permitted to
assert a qualified immunity from monetary damage suits. For example,
in Buller v. Buechler12 the Eighth Circuit confronted a section 1983
action brought against private parties following their invocation of a
213
state garnishment statute with the aid of state officials.
The Buller court emphasized the injustice that would arise were state
officials permitted to plead qualified immunity when the private parties
with whom they were involved could not avail themselves of the same
immunity defense. 2 4 The court noted both the pre-1871 existence of a

118. Id. at 1037-38 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 1038.
120. 445 U.S. 622, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1981).
121. Folsom, 681 F.2d 1032, 1038.
122. 706 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1983). See also, e.g., Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest
Bank Watertown, N.A., 830 F.2d 1487 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1001, 108
S. Ct. 1723 (1988) (the Eighth Circuit, citing Buller, acknowledged the availability of a
qualified immunity. to private parties who relied on a presumptively valid attachment
statute).
123. The Eighth Circuit has re-stated substantially the same position regarding qualified
immunity in other* cases. See, e.g., Lux v. Hansen, 886 F.2d 1064, 1066-67 (8th Cir.
1989) (protection of qualified immunity extends to private party defendants who act in
joint participation with public officials).
124. Note should be made, however, of a subsequent Eighth Circuit case, Chicago &
N.W. Transp. Co. v. Ulery, 787 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1986). The case involved a private
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defense based on probable cause in analogous areas of tort law and
compelling social policy justifications for permitting private defendants
to rely on a qualified immunity defense. "It would be anomalous,"
observed the court,
to hold that private individuals are state actors within the meaning of section 1983 because they invoked a state garnishment
statute and the aid of state officers but deny those private
individuals the qualified immunity possessed by the state officials
with whom they dealt because they technically are not state
employees.'25
Similarly, in Jones v. Preuit and Mauldin2 6 the Eleventh Circuit,
confronted with an attachment proceeding which had given rise to a
section 1983 damage claim, held that a private defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity unless, following the Harlow standard, "he knew or
should have known that his actions violated clearly established constitutional rights."' 2 7 The Eleventh Circuit emphasized the injustice that
would necessarily follow private defendants and public officials were
treated unequally. "Since Lugar rests on the premise that private and
public actors may sometimes be equated, there is little reason to deny
to private defendants the type of immunity which has been granted to
public defendants."' 28 Further, the Eleventh Circuit recognized a significant point that escaped attention in many other cases. Specifically,
when the dual requirements of section 1983 for proof of conduct under
color of law and of the Fourteenth Amendment for state action are
satisfied in section 1983 damage suits brought against private parties,
those private parties are transformed for all relevant purposes into quasistate actors and thus would appear to be entitled to the same immunity
from suit that traditional state actors enjoy.
Although these and related cases from the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits differ in various regards, they share a common denominator-each involved a private defendant whose assertion of qualified
immunity was based on conduct authorized by a presumptively valid

party defendant in a section 1983 action, and the Eighth Circuit refused to apply the
rule of immediate appealability of refusals to grant qualified immunity to government
officials established in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985), on the
grounds that the rule "has no application . . . where the defendants . . . are not public
officials but private parties suable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 only because they allegedly
conspired with other persons acting under color of state law." Chicago & N. W. Transp.
Co., 787 F.2d at 1240-41.
125. Buller, 706 F.2d at 851.
126. 851 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 489 U.S.
1002, 109 S. Ct. 1105 (1989).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1325.
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state statute. With the scope of both section 1983 and Bivens damage
suits reaching beyond conduct authorized by statutes, it is reasonable
to ask whether this statutory common denominator serves as a necessary
condition for qualified immunity.
The apparent answer is that qualified immunity can be asserted in
other types of situations. This is particularly well-illustrated by DeVargas
v. Mason & Hanger-SilasMason Co. 29 DeVargas involved both a section
1983 and a Bivens action, the Bivens action flowing from the alleged
involvement of federal officials in conduct said to have deprived the
plaintiff of access to employment. Importantly, the conduct of the private
defendant was said to have been required by the terms of a government
contract rather than a state or federal statute. Although the trial court
had recognized the immunity of the government officials from damage
suits, it had denied the private defendant's claim to qualified immunity.
Under the rule established by Mitchell,'3 ° the Tenth Circuit was asked
to review the denial of immunity.
The DeVargascourt experienced little difficulty in reaching the holding that the trial court had erred in its denial of qualified immunity to
the private defendants. Those defendants, the court argued, "reasonably
thought that their contract with a government body required them to
act in a certain manner.' ' 3' The court then identified two compelling
reasons why the private defendants deserved qualified immunity from
damage suits.
First, the government authority involved requires private defendants to act as they do. Indeed, were they to act otherwise they
would likely be liable for breach of contract to the governmental
body with whom they contracted. Not to allow immunity here
places defendants between Scylla and Charybdis-potentially liable either to plaintiffs for obeying the contract, or to govern-

ment bodies for breaching

it.132

More important to the purpose of this analysis, the court went on to
argue that
the functions which the private parties performed pursuant to
contract are functions which governmental employees would perform had the government not contracted them out. The Supreme
Court instructs courts to examine the function of individual
defendants-the nature of their individual responsibilities-not
their status, in resolving immunity defenses. . . . We conclude

129.
130.
131.
132.

844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 799 (1991).
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985).
DeVargas, 844 F.2d at 722 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 721-22.
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that when private party defendants act in accordance with the
duties imposed by a contract with a governmental body, perform
a governmental function, and are sued solely on the basis of
those acts performed pursuant to contract, qualified immunity
33
is proper. 1
2.

Lower Court Decisions Refusing to Accord Qualified
Immunity to Private Defendants

These and related cases coming from the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits have not been persuasive to the other federal circuits
that have considered the issue. 34 Elsewhere one finds a combination of
disagreement, confusion, and indecision. Thus, refusals to accord qualified immunity to private defendants must be categorized somewhat
awkwardly into refusals to take a position on the issue, proposals that
something analogous to but different from qualified immunity be made
available to private defendants, and simple rejections of the hypothesis
that qualified immunity can be asserted by private defendants in constitutional tort damage suits.
First, confusion about or refusals to rule on the qualified immunity
issue is well-illustrated b Henry v. Ryan,' a recent section 1983 case
decided by the district court for the Northern District of Illinois, which
falls within the Seventh Circuit. In this unusual case a state court found
Henry in contempt following his refusal to provide blood and saliva
samples as required by a grand jury subpoena and confined him in a
county jail until he agreed to provide the samples. Henry claimed violations of rights secured by the Fourth Amendment and subsequently
brought a section 1983 action against DuPage County, Illinois, various
county officials, and private employees of a corporation which provided
medical services to the county in its jail. The government officials and
the private employees contended that any applicable Fourth Amendment
right was not clearly established at the time of the incident and that
they therefore enjoyed a qualified immunity from Henry's damage suit.
The district court had little difficulty in finding the government
officials immune from the damage aspect of the plaintiff's suit. It also
had little difficulty in finding that the medical services firm and its
employees met the fair attribution test the Supreme Court developed in
Lugar and applied in the contract medical services case of West v.

133. Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
134. Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1982); Buller v. Buechler,
706 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1983); DeVargas, 844 F.2d 714; and Jones v. Preuit and Mauldin,
808 F.2d 1435 (l1th Cir. 1987).
135. 775 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. 111.1991).
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Atkins. 3 6 However, finding no guidance in earlier Seventh Circuit cases,
the court looked to cases previously decided in the Fifth, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits.
The court saw a particularly close relationship with the decision of
the Tenth Circuit in DeVargas v. Mason & Hangar-SilasMason Co.' 7
and focused on the contractual obligations of the private firm and its
employees. This immediately produced confusion. The DeVargas court
had not confronted the government contracting for jail or prison services
and had explicitly refused to reach any conclusion regarding "the propriety of granting qualified immunity when a private contractor performing a governmental function, such as operating a prison, performs
acts not required by the contract.""'3 The district court then observed
that "[allthough the company and its employees seem to have been
perforning a function ordinarily within the government's province, it
is not clear whether the actions taken ... were pursuant to a policy
dictated by contractual terms and/or applicable state law."'' 9 The court
declined to rule on the qualified immunity issue until it had more
information regarding the nature of the services provided by the private
firm and its employees.
A second and in some ways an even more troublesome approach
to the immunity issue is illustrated by Duncan v. Peck.'14 There the
Sixth Circuit began its analysis in a traditional, straightforward manner
by considering whether common-law immunities were available to private
defendants in attachment cases at the time when section 1983 was enacted
and whether strong policy reasons justifying immunity could be iden4
tified.' '
Unlike most of the cases discussed previously, however, the Sixth
Circuit found no basis for according qualified immunity to private
defendants either in common law or in social policy considerations and
thus declined to follow the precedent established by those cases. Instead,
the court contended that prior holdings permitting private parties to
raise immunity defenses had "improperly confused good faith immunity
with a good faith defense."' ' 42 The court then advanced the atypical
view that public officials should be permitted to raise a qualified immunity, which "is designed to protect defendants from the difficulties
of defending a suit by dismissing the case before the parties have engaged

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

487 U.S. 42, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988).
844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 799 (1991).
Id. at 722 n.1l.
Henry v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247, 251 (N.D. Il1. 1991).
844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1266.
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in costly and time consuming discovery,"'' 43 and that private parties
should be permitted to raise a good faith defense, which "is likely to
be based in large part on the facts of the case, with the suit only being
dismissed after trial, or on summary judgment if the defendant can
show that there is no material dispute as to the facts."'"
Although the application of this distinction to the case at hand
resulted in a decision to affirm the trial court's granting of summary
judgment, the double standard advanced in Duncan is troublesome. It
recommends applying the Harlow-mandated objective test only to immunity claims by public officials but applying a subjective test to good
faith claims advanced by private parties whose conduct satisfies the fair
attribution test of Lugar. Adopting such an approach clearly would
disallow a termination of meritless cases on motions for summary judgment so long as plaintiffs were sufficiently creative in framing their
pleadings. This, of course, is precisely what the Supreme Court sought
45
to avoid by its holding in Harlow.
Finally, the rule of law being applied in some federal circuits is
that private defendants in constitutional tort damage suits cannot assert
a qualified immunity. An early example of this matter-of-fact position
was provided in 1978 by the First Circuit in Downs v. Sawtelle.'"
However, this case is of questionable merit because it was decided before
both Lugar and Harlow. At least in some ways, therefore, cases like
Howerton v. Gabica'47 should be seen as more authoritative.
Howerton involved an effort by a landlord to evict two tenants who
had failed to pay their rent. The issue before the Ninth Circuit following
a trial court dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit was quite narrow: Had the
degree of assistance provided by local police to the appellees during the
course of their efforts to evict the appellants been sufficient to convert
their private conduct into state action within the meaning of section
1983? The presence of a relevant state statute coupled with the involve-

143. Id.
144. Id. The awkward approach taken by the Sixth Circuit in Duncan may have been
persuasive in section 1983 actions brought in at least some state courts. See, e.g., Alaska
Pac. Assur. Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984), and Stensvad v. Towe, 759 P.2d
138 (Mont. 1988). This surely is true regarding the latter case in that the court expressly
speaks in terms of a good faith defense which is an issue of fact. Id. at 143. The former
case, however, may reflect nothing more than a court relying upon pre-Lugar terms of
art (e.g., "good faith compliance with a validly enacted law") when the test is in fact
objective rather than subjective and when the issue is one of pure law rather than of
fact.
145. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982).
146. 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910, 99 S. Ct. 278 (1978); see also
Lovell v. One Bancorp, 878 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1989) (appellate court lacked jurisdiction
to hear interlocutory appeal following trial court's refusal to accord private section 1983
defendant qualified immunity).
147. 708 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1982).
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ment of a local police officer was such that the court had little difficulty
finding that the conduct of the appellees met both the "state action"
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and the "color of law"
requirement of section 1983.
Importantly, no immunity issue was before the court. Further, the
text of the opinion provides no discussion or analysis of qualified
immunity. Nonetheless, Judge Fletcher, writing for the three-member
court, included a brief footnote in which he concluded that "there is
no good faith immunity under section 1983 for private parties who act
under color of state law to deprive an individual of his or.her consti' 48
tutional rights.' 1
Despite the fact that the language of this footnote regarding an
issue not before the court should be classified only as dicta, recent
decisions by the Ninth Circuit rely on Howerton as persuasive if not
mandatory precedent. For example, Howerton appears to have been
taken as mandatory precedent in the recent case of F.E. Trotter, Inc.
v. Watkins.' 49 There, dealing with a Bivens rather than a section 1983
damage suit and relying directly on Howerton, the Ninth Circuit held
that "qualified immunity is not available to private parties in a Bivens
suit."s 0
Even more recently the Ninth Circuit, in Conner v. City of Santa
Ana, 5' indirectly relied on Howerton in a section 1983 case based in
part on a private towing company's and its employees' warrantless seizure
and removal of plaintiffs' vehicles per the request of local police. The
court reasoned that any constitutional rights of the plaintiffs had not
been clearly recognized at the time of the seizure and removal and
accorded qualified immunity to all non-municipal defendants 5 2 The
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, finding that the relevant
law was clearly established. Somewhat ironically, however, a footnote
in the case simply asserts that the trial court's "grant of immunity must
also be reversed as private parties acting under color of law are not
153
entitled to qualified immunity defense.'
The Probable Consequences of the Decision of the Supreme
Court in Wyatt v. Cole.
With the contradictory positions taken by the federal circuit courts
giving rise to growing confusion, it was clear that the Supreme Court
C.

148.

Id. at 385 n.10.

149.

869 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1989).

150. Id. at 1318.
151. 897 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1990).
152. Id. at 1490.
153. Id, at 1492 n.9. The authority ited in the footnote is F.E. Totter, Inc. v.
Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1989), but it has already been observed that this case
relied on Howerton for its authority.
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would be forced to devise one or more means of evaluating claims of
qualified immunity for private party defendants in section 1983 and
Bivens damage actions. Its first but almost certainly not last effort to
do so came toward the end of its 1991-92 term in the case of Wyatt
54
v. Cole.1
The facts in Wyatt are fairly typical of cases in which private parties,
with significant assistance from state officials, relied upon a presumptively valid state statute in the pursuit of their commercial interests.
Specifically, Cole and his attorney filed a complaint in replevin in a
Mississippi court against Wyatt. The state court, to which the statute
granted no discretion when relevant procedures had been followed, issued
an order for the seizure of various property in the possession of Wyatt.
After a post-seizure hearing, Cole's complaint in replevin was dismissed, and he was ordered to return the seized property to Wyatt.
Cole refused to comply with the order. Wyatt then brought suit in a
federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of the Mississippi
statute, to seek injunctive relief, and to obtain damages from the county
sheriff, the deputies who had been involved in the seizure, Cole, and
Cole's attorney.
The district court invalidated the state statute on due process grounds
but, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity, dismissed
the suit against both the government officials and the private parties.1 5
The grant of qualified immunity to all defendants was subsequently
affirmed by the Fifth Circuit,156 but the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in an effort to resolve the existing conflicts between the federal circuits.
Suffice it to say that an expansive interpretation will be accorded
Wyatt by plaintiffs' attorneys and that quite a narrow interpretation
will be advanced by defendants' attorneys. A fair reading of the case,
however, reveals multiple points at which the Wyatt majority sought to
avoid reaching beyond the limited facts of the case before the Court.
This is well-illustrated by the Court's observation that
[t]he question on which we granted certiorari is a very narrow
one: "[W]hether private persons, who conspire with state officials to violate constitutional rights, have available the good
faith immunity applicable to public officials. . . ." The precise
issue encompassed in this question ... is whether qualified
immunity ... is available for private defendants faced with

154. 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).
155. Wyatt v. Cole, 710 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Miss. 1989), aff'd, 928 F.2d 718 (5th
Cir.), rehg denied, 934 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 47 (1991) and
rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 1827 (1992).
156. Wyatt v. Cole, 928 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 934 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.),
cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 47 (1991) and rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).
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Section 1983 liability for invoking a state replevin,
garnishment
57
or attachment statute. That answer is no.
The Court fashioned a rationale for the apparently narrow holding
in Wyatt by retracing the familiar two-part test involving an examination
both of immunities that existed when section 1983 was enacted in 1871
and of policy considerations. Significantly, the emphasis was on the
policy considerations. The Court concluded that those policy considerations did not support the desire of the private party defendants in
Wyatt-type cases to enjoy a qualified immunity from suit.
Although principles of equality and fairness may suggest ...
that private citizens who rely unsuspectingly on state laws they
did not create and may have no reason to believe are invalid
should have some protection from liability, as do their government counterparts, such interests are not sufficiently similar to
the traditional purposes of qualified immunity to justify such
an expansion.'
The rationale and holding of Wyatt will be a source of obvious
concern to those sensitive to the unfairness of a private defendant being
obliged to shoulder the burden of proceeding to trial when the public
officials on whose assistance they relied are able to assert a qualified
immunity from suit. More than one person to whom the holding applies
will see little to defend the double standard it establishes.
Importantly, however, given the narrowness of the Wyatt holding
and its accompanying rationale, one cannot fairly read Wyatt as being
the final word. It certainly does not stand for the principle that private
defendants in section 1983 or Bivens damage suits cannot assert a
qualified immunity. To the contrary, it can be argued that private parties
working under contract with governmental entities and whose contractual
obligations call for them to serve the public interest are in a position
which is so closely analogous to their public sector counterparts that
no meaningful distinction relevant to qualified immunity can be drawn
between them and public officials. After all, it is settled law that access
to qualified immunity is linked to the function a defendant fulfills rather
than the position he or she holds. When the function a private employee
serves is equivalent to the function a public official would otherwise
serve, it follows that the same policy considerations which support
qualified immunity of the public official would also support qualified
immunity of the private employee. Thus, the test advanced by the Court
in Procunier v. Navarette59 and modified by Harlow v. Fitzgerald'6°

157.
158.
159.
160.

Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1834 (1992).
Id. at 1833.
434 U.S. 555, 98 S. Ct. 855 (1978).
457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
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that permits public prison officials to assert qualified immunity from
damage suits should apply with equal force to private prison officials
in the wake of Wyatt.
IV.

INTERPRETATION

AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATIZATION

Few would disagree with the assertion that the development of the
state action doctrine through which the Court has expanded the scope
of section 1983 and Bivens suits and the qualified immunity doctrine
through which the Court has tried to insulate defendants from the
negative effects of frivolous damage suits are among the most difficult
aspects of constitutional tort jurisprudence. When both doctrines are
confronted simultaneously-as they must be in a variety of situations
involving privatization-significant disagreement and confusion necessarily materialize.
To be sure, the Court has had more than one opportunity to decrease
6
the magnitude of the problem. When Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.1 1
was decided a decade ago, for example, the Court could have refined
both the state action and qualified immunity doctrines. Although Justice
Powell clearly felt that Lugar suggested the availability of an immunity
from suit for private defendants in section 1983 and, at least by implication, Bivens damage suits, 62 the Court expressly declined to rule
64
on the issue.163 The recent holding of the Court in Wyatt v. Cole1
may clarify immunity law as it applies in damage suits whose facts are
dominated by debtor-creditor disputes, but it leaves at least as many
issues open as it closes.
The only means for resolving the continuing ambiguities is to identify
the root cause of the disarray one finds in past opinions and to suggest
how the present confusion should be reduced or eliminated in the troublesome cases that privatization initiatives are certain to produce. Of
particular importance to this analysis is how the issue should be resolved
in situations which involve types of privatization that find private firms
contracting with government to provide types of services that historically
have been provided largely or exclusively by government itself.
The position taken here is easily summarized. It is settled law that
deprivations of constitutional rights caused by private conduct are or-

161. 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982).
162. Id. at 956 n.14, 102 S. Ct. at 2763 n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 942 n.23, 102 S. Ct. at 2756 n.23. Importantly, however, the same note
does clearly express the view that the Court favored establishing an affirmative defense
for private defendants in constitutional tort cases over defining the scope of such actions
so narrowly as to change the dominant view of when they could be brought against
private parties.
164.

112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).
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dinarily beyond the scope of the remedies provided by both section 1983
and Bivens. In the section 1983 context, for instance, the Fourteenth
Amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful.", 65 Even private conduct authorized by state
law and which therefore meets the "color of law" prerequisite of a
section 1983 action does not by itself alter this reality. There must be
more. In both the section 1983 and the Bivens contexts, there must be
persuasive evidence that the conduct of the private party is fairly attributable to the state itself.'"
The conversion of private conduct into "state action" for section
1983 purposes or "federal action" for Bivens purposes is not easy.
"Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance."' 67 However, when a plaintiff can shoulder the burden of
proving that private conduct is fairly attributable to government, the
private defendant is transformed into a quasi-state or quasi-federal official. Simple considerations of fairness and equity support allowing such
persons the same basic protections against groundless damage suits as
are enjoyed by their counterparts who are government officials.'"
To be sure, the holding in Wyatt v. Cole'69 undermines any argument
that a fairness rationale standing alone will persuade the Supreme Court
to enthusiastically view claims of qualified immunity by any and all
private defendants who satisfy the "state action" and "color of law"
tests. There must be more at stake than the commercial interests of
defendants who relied on a state replevin, garnishment, or attachment
statute. There must also be a sound basis for contending that claims
for qualified immunity are bolstered by a compelling public policy
rationale. If the facts of past section 1983 and Bivens actions involving
private defendants are at all representative, then such a public policy
rationale will not be available to many if not most private defendants.
Notwithstanding the holding in Wyatt, when the function of a private
employee is substantially identical to that of what otherwise would be
a public official, then a firm foundation for both-or neither-being
70
able to assert a qualified immunity from damage suits remains in place.'

165.
166.

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S. Ct. 836, 842 (1948).
See, e.g., Lugar, 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744.

167. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722, 81 S. Ct. 856, 860
(1961).
168. The position advanced here regarding qualified immunity does not extend to such
other immunities as sovereign immunity or Eleventh Amendment immunities.
169. 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).
170. The relevant case law consistently examines the function being served by the
conduct of one who asserts qualified immunity rather than the nature of the position
occupied by such a person. See, e.g., Burns v. Reed, Ill S. Ct. 1934 (1991); Butz v.
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Privatization initiatives such as the private management of jails and
prisons create precisely this foundation.
Stating a matter-of-fact position on the qualified immunity issueeven though it is a position that a majority of the federal circuits which
have considered the issue seem inclined to accept-does little to advance
the analysis. What is required is a critical assessment of how some
federal and state courts have arrived at a contrary conclusion. Such an
assessment must provide a more solid basis for anticipating how subsequent courts will deal with qualified immunity cases in the context of
the types of privatization under consideration. Thus, the balance of this
section will focus on general problems with the approaches some courts
appear to have taken, more specific problems with the types of cases
on which attention has most commonly focused, and the implications
the analysis has for privatization.
A.

The Core Problem of HistoricalBalance

If there is a single flaw in the approach some courts-including the
Supreme Court-have taken to the problem of qualified immunity, it
is one of historical balance. Initial considerations of qualified immunity
were not necessary until, in effect, the Supreme Court created the two
dominant forms of constitutional torts in Monroe v. Pape7 , and in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
1 2 in 1961 and 1971. Monroe
Narcotics"
and its progeny transformed what
for nearly one hundred years had been a largely dormant and inconsequential provision of federal civil rights law into a very broad civil
remedy by which those who suffered deprivations caused by state conduct
could obtain relief. It cannot plausibly be argued that the Forty-Second
Congress imagined the diverse uses to which the Civil Rights Act of
1871 would be put. Substantially the same can fairly be said of the
novel' civil remedy the Supreme Court forged in Bivens for those who
suffered deprivations as a consequence of federal conduct.
Notwithstanding these fairly obvious facts, a majority of the courts
that have addressed the appropriateness of qualified immunity for either
public or private defendants have applied a two-pronged test. This is
most obvious in the section 1983 context. First, was an equivalent
immunity available in 1871? Second, are there compelling policy considerations that recommend according a qualified immunity from suit?
Although some relevant cases either ignore the historical prong of the

Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers
Union, 446 U.S. 719, 100 S. Ct. 1967 (1980).
171. 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961).
172. 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971).
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test altogether or assign it comparatively little significance, the typical
case involves an appellate court applying what amounts to an historical
litmus test.
The test is badly flawed even if viewed as potentially relevant in
the first place. This was established early in this analysis.' 73 Beyond that
fair criticism of the historical litmus test is the logical flaw in the
approach taken by courts which apply it. Specifically, judicial decisions
of the post-Monroe era permit plaintiffs to name private party defendants
in section 1983 and Bivens damage suits. These decisions greatly expanded
the scope of the remedy provided by section 1983 or the more recent
remedy provided by Bivens.
To expand the scope of civil remedies but to preserve a focus on
the history of immunities is flawed in at least two regards. It offends
common sense notions of balance and fairness. It also instantly places
private defendants in an impossible position. This was recently described
74
quite well by Eid:
The problem stems from the fact that the Court has used
history to inform its analysis of the scope of immunity to Section
1983 liability but has neglected history when considering the
scope of the liability itself ....
This inconsistency has not posed
a problem for public officers because they enjoyed the protection
of immunities at common law. But private parties are not similarly situated. They were not entitled to immunity protection
in 1871 because they had no need of it; they were not considered
state actors under Section 1983 for another century. Thus, to
look back at the common law for an answer to the question
whether a private individual in a particular situation is entitled
to claim an immunity is to answer the question before the inquiry
begins.
There simply is no need to preserve the awkwardness or unfairness
of this fundamentally flawed historical litmus test if its purpose is to
promote the core objectives of section 1983 or Bivens. Those objectives
clearly are to deter conduct fairly attributable to the state that causes
constitutional deprivations and to provide a civil remedy in situations
within which the deterrent objective has not been achieved.
Permitting private defendants in these actions to assert a. qualified
immunity does not defeat those objectives. It does nothing more than
permit those defendants to terminate insubstantial suits on motions for
summary judgment. In cases involving deprivations of clearly recognized

173. See supra text accompanying notes 60-70.
174. Allison H. Eid, Private Party Immunities to Section 1983 Suits, 57 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1323, 1346 (1990) (emphasis added).
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rights, plaintiffs' actions would survive. Indeed, it has been shown that
the range and the quality of remedies available in actions brought against
private defendants is greater than those that would be available in
substantially identical actions brought against public officials. 17
B. Distinguishing Between a Fairness and a Compelling Public
Policy Basis for Qualified Immunity
The case can and should be made that another fundamental cause
of the disparity one finds in the reactions of the courts to efforts by
private defendants in section 1983 and Bivens damage suits can be traced
to the imperfect reasoning of the Supreme Court in Lugar. Lugar
involved a small wholesale oil dealer to whom money was owed by the
operator of a truckstop. The creditor relied upon a presumptively valid
state statute to seek prejudgment attachment of the debtor's property.
A writ of attachment was issued and executed by a county sheriff, but
a state trial court, after finding that the creditor had not satisfied the
statutory grounds for the attachment in his ex parte petition, ordered
the attachment dismissed. The debtor then brought a section 1983 action
against the creditor in which he alleged that the joint conduct of state
officials and the creditor had deprived him of his property without due
76
process of law.
The critical portion of Lugar is not what it does contain but what
it lacks. What it lacks is a plaintiff who brought a section 1983 action
against a state official whose involvement with the creditor was such
that the Court found that the private defendant was a state actor. If
the true purpose of section 1983 is to shield "any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof" from constitutional
deprivations caused by state action, then the proper defendant in creditordebtor cases like Lugar should be the state official who rendered aid
and assistance rather than the creditor who relied on a presumptively
valid state statute. It is, after all, the active involvement of state officials
that transforms what would be purely private conduct, which falls beyond
the scope of either section 1983 or Bivens, into state or federal action.
This critique of the state action doctrine does not'require further
development here. It is important to recognize, however, that much of
the tension one finds in recent developments of the qualified immunity
doctrine is distorted by cases which present facts that are similar to
those in Lugar. If the core purpose of qualified immunity is to serve
the public interest by increasing the likelihood that public officials will
pursue their responsibilities as vigorously as possible, that purpose is

175.
176.
(1982).

Thomas, supra note 3.
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924-25, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2747
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not served by according qualified immunity to a private party defendant
whose interest is purely commercial. Indeed, when confronted with such
cases, the courts are left with no justification for according qualified
immunity other than that of fairness.
Cases of the type represented by Lugar and Wyatt are easily distinguished from situations involving private parties working under contract with government to provide services government otherwise would
be obliged to provide itself. Correctional privatization initiatives illustrate
this fact particularly well. Private corrections firms and their employees
will argue that they should be able to raise a qualified immunity from
insubstantial section 1983 or Bivens suits because considerations of fairness recommend against their being treated any differently than their
public sector counterparts to whom qualified immunity has been available
since the Supreme Court decided Procunier v. Navarette'77 in 1978.
Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Wyatt, however, fairness
cannot be the only or even the primary supporting rationale.
A fairness rationale must be pushed to the side and at least two
other considerations must be pushed into sharp relief. First, emphasis
must be given to the manner in which the conduct of a private party
defendant was either authorized or required by the terms of a contract.
Second, special attention must be given to how the absence of qualified
immunity would hamper the ability of a private defendant in a section
1983 or Bivens damage suit to act on behalf of government in the
service of the public interest. The Court has repeatedly emphasized the
notion that "public officers require this protection to shield them from
undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats
of liability."' 78 Often, argued the Court in Harlow, damage suits
run against the innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not
only to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole. These
social costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of
official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence
of able citizens from acceptance of public office. Finally, there
is the danger that fear of being sued will "dampen the ardor
of all but the most resolute ... in the unflinching discharge of
179
their duties."'
The implication is clear. Heavy responsibilities are imposed on those
who manage the nation's jails and prisons. The efficient and effective
discharge of those responsibilities-without regard to whether those responsibilities fall on the shoulders of public or private persons-is of
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434 U.S. 555, 98 S. Ct. 855 (1978).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2732 (1982).
Id. at 814, 102 S. Ct. at 2736, quoting from Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,
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vital significance both to those who are confined and who work within
the nation's correctional system and to the general public. A recognition
of these realities stands as the principal justification for permitting public
correctional officials to assert a qualified immunity. Because the functions of public and private corrections officials are indistinguishable, the
same compelling policy justifications should be relied upon to allow
both to enjoy a qualified immunity from insubstantial section 1983 and
Bivens damage suits.
V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Government is confronting growing pressures to devise more efficient
and effective means of providing essential public services. Increasingly
often, responses to these pressures find government contracting with the
private sector for services that government traditionally has provided
largely or entirely through the efforts of public agencies and their
employees. Indeed, during the past decade the privatization movement
has reached beyond efforts to rely on private means of delivering types
of public services that have no special governmental basis and into areas
once thought of as being inherently governmental in their character.
This is best exemplified by the rapidly growing appeal of correctional
privatization.1 10
Decisions to privatize in such areas as corrections often were made
in the absence of clear understandings of the legal implications of the
decisions. This was unavoidable. Policy makers were forced to choose
between a "business as usual" approach in corrections or contract with
private corrections firms with the full knowledge that the resulting
blurring of the boundaries between the public and private sectors would
ultimately give rise to new law. It was not possible to know the precise
form the new law would take. The development of that body of law
could not begin to take form until actual disputes confronted the courts.
This analysis has focused on one troublesome but important area
of law whose parameters continue to be poorly defined. Specifically,
much historical experience reveals that prisoners are predisposed to litigate constitutional claims aggressively. That a subset of these suits has
merit is obvious to anyone who has even the most casual awareness of

180.

Prior to the early 1980s there were no jails or prisons in the United States that

were managed by private firms. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 24. However, the most
recent research on the development of correctional privatization reveals that eighteen
private firms presently have contracts to operate such facilities, that fifty-two facilities
housing a total of 17,317 prisoners are now under private management, and that an
additional eight facilities with a design capacity of 5202 prisoners will be opened by June
30, 1993. Charles W. Thomas, Growth in Corrections Accelerates, Public Works Financing
II,

13 (July/August 1992).
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how correctional law has developed during the past quarter of a century.
It is no less obvious that a large proportion of prisoner suits brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens are without substance. Recognizing
compelling policy reasons for the earliest possible termination of insubstantial damage suits, the Supreme Court has permitted public correctional officials to assert a qualified immunity from suits involving
deprivations of constitutional rights that were not clearly recognized at
the time of the alleged deprivation. The availability of qualified immunity
to those officials generally allows them to terminate insubstantial suits
on motions for summary judgment. However, whether the same immunity will be made available to similarly situated private correctional
employees has not been decided.
Based on a review of the development of the qualified immunity
doctrine and its application to cases involving private defendants in
section 1983 and Bivens damage suits, the analysis reveals that the federal
circuit courts are in sharp disagreement regarding whether private defendants can assert a qualified immunity. To be sure, many of the cases
reviewed involved suits which involved creditor-debtor relationships and
thus may not be of great value to those concerned with the legal
implications of privatization. Ambiguities involving these cases are likely
to be reduced substantially following the recent decision in Wyatt. However, cases involving the pursuit of commercial interests by private parties
whose conduct meets the state action requirement purely because they
received significant assistance from state or federal officials are easily
distinguished from those involving the pursuit of public interest by private
parties whose contracts oblige them to work on behalf of public agencies.
Unfortunately, the contrary positions advanced by the circuit courts do
not vanish when attention focuses narrowly on situations involving private defendants who engaged in conduct permitted or required by their
contracts with government."8 '
The rationale of courts that have declined to permit private defendants in section 1983 or Bivens actions to assert a qualified immunity
from damage suits relies heavily on a combination of historical and
policy considerations. The historical focus, which is especially apparent

181. See, e.g., DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714 (10th
Cir. 1988) (private party defendants acting in accordance with government contract may
assert qualified immunity in section 1983 damage suit); F.E. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins,
869 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1989) (private party defendants acting in accordance with government contract may not assert qualified immunity from Bivens damage suit); Conner
v. City of Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1990) (private. defendants acting on
instructions of local police to remove vehicles from private property may not assert qualified
immunity from section 1983 suit); and Henry v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. 111.1991)
(declining to rule on availability to qualified immunity in section 1983 action by private
provider of medical services in local jail).
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in section 1983 cases, emphasizes the immunities that were available to
public and private parties more than one hundred years ago. This
approach tends to result in the conclusion that private defendants enjoyed
no common-law immunities and thus should not be accorded any new
immunity in the constitutional tort context. The policy focus emphasizes
the fact that disallowing qualified immunity to private defendants does
not interfere with their ability to serve the public interest because, at
least in the typical case, their conduct is aimed at serving a purely
private rather than a public interest.
This analysis sharply criticizes the validity of these historical and
policy considerations. The basis for the criticism has at least four facets.
First, even in situations which involve private defendants whose interests
are essentially commercial, significance should be given to preserving
the fairness of the legal process. The creditor-debtor cases reviewed in
the analysis, for instance, involve damage suits brought by debtors
against creditors who relied on presumptively valid state statutes and
who received consequential assistance from state officials. Regardless of
whether the common law of the last century recognized an immunity
from suit by such private defendants, considerations of simple fairness
and equity recommend immunity when the alleged deprivations involve
a constitutional right that was not clearly recognized at the time of the
alleged misconduct. Those who accept this criticism will see little judicial
wisdom in the position taken by the Court in Wyatt.
Second, it is unclear whether the Forty-Second Congress intended
to disallow claims of absolute or qualified immunity. Thus, even if
some special significance is attributed to historical considerations, the
validity of any historical litmus test is easily challenged.
Third, post-Monroe judicial enlargements of the scope of section
1983 and more recent interpretations of the scope of suits brought under
Bivens radically redefined the meaning of the term "constitutional tort."
It is exceedingly difficult to adhere to a rigid and arguably flawed
conception of the history of immunities and also to accept a so highly
flexible definition of what constitutes a section 1983 or Bivens cause of
action.
Finally, it is undeniably true that the same public policy rationale
which forms the foundation for authorizing public officials to assert a
qualified immunity from damage suits is not necessarily sound in cases
involving private defendants. However, as more and more essential public
services flow from contracts with the private sector rather than from
the efforts of public officials, the public policy basis for according
qualified immunity to public officials applies with precisely the same
force to private parties.
There are, of course, harsh critics of correctional privatization who
have strong ideological objections to any mechanism which would elevate
the appeal of private corrections firms to government. Just as those
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critics claimed, with little if any legal basis and with no success whatsoever in the courts, that decisions to privatize were inherently unconstitutional, they are likely to attack the conclusions reached here as ones
that unfairly and improperly create an advantage for the private corrections industry.
This criticism is wrong as a matter of both fact and law. The only
implication of the conclusions reached in this analysis is that both public
and private corrections employees confront exceedingly difficult responsibilities, responsibilities that demand much of them as they work in
contexts known to be ones which routinely give rise to damage suits.
To shield both equally from insubstantial suits, and also to expose each
group equally to more consequential litigation, strikes a reasonable balance between the legitimate interests of prisoner plaintiffs and the larger
public interest. It also is equitable and just in the most fundamental
meaning of those terms.

